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Abstract—We consider the problem of designing pri-
vate information retrieval (PIR) schemes on data of m
files replicated on n servers that can possibly collude. We
focus on devising robust PIR schemes that can tolerate
stragglers, i.e., slow or unresponsive servers. In many
settings, the number of stragglers is not known a priori
or may change with time. We define universally robust
PIR as schemes that achieve PIR capacity asymptotically
in m and simultaneously for any number of stragglers up
to a given threshold. We introduce Staircase-PIR schemes
and prove that they are universally robust. Towards that
end, we establish an equivalence between robust PIR and
communication efficient secret sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of designing PIR schemes
on replicated data [1], [2], i.e., the data consisting of
m files is replicated on n servers that can possibly
collude. A user queries the servers to obtain a file
of interest while keeping private the identity of the
file, even if t servers collude with t < n. We focus
on information-theoretic privacy (instead of compu-
tational privacy), which guarantees privacy without
making any assumption on the computation power of
the servers as long as no more than t servers collude.
Robustness: Under the setting described above, we are
interested in PIR schemes that are robust. A robust
PIR scheme allows the user to retrieve the file by
receiving responses from any k servers t < k ≤ n.
The robustness property is motivated by the need to
mitigate the effect of stragglers [3]–[14].
PIR capacity: A challenge in designing PIR schemes
is maximizing their download rate defined as the ratio
of the retrieved file size to the amount of information
downloaded by the user. The PIR capacity is defined
as the maximal rate achievable by a PIR scheme and
was shown in [15] to be
Cm(t, k) =
1− t/k
1− (t/k)
m . (1)
Note that Cm(t, k) converges exponentially with the
number of files m to its asymptotic value
C(t, k) = 1−
t
k
. (2)
This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635.
The authors are with the ECE department of Rutgers University,
Piscataway, New Jersey. Emails: firstname.lastname@rutgers.edu.
For instance, for m = 3 files and k = 10 servers,
C3(1, 10) is at 99% of its asymptotic value C(1, 10)
(assuming no collusion t = 1). Given the tremendous
amount of files being stored in current systems, we fo-
cus on PIR schemes achieving the asymptotic capacity
given in (2).
Universality: In many cases, the exact number of
stragglers is not known a priori. This motivates the
study of universally robust PIR schemes that can tol-
erate a varying number of stragglers. More precisely,
a universally robust PIR scheme allows the user to
query n servers and retrieve the wanted file from any µ
responses, k ≤ µ ≤ n, while achieving the asymptotic
PIR capacity C(t, µ) given in (2) simultaneously for
all possible values of µ. Although a robust PIR scheme
designed for the worst case number of stragglers
(µ = k) can tolerate up to n−k stragglers, it does not
necessarily achieve the capacity for all possible values
of µ.
In the case where the stragglers are non-responsive,
universally robust PIR guarantees that the user can
always obtain the file even if up to n − k servers
do not reply to its queries. On the other hand, when
the stragglers are slow servers, universally robust PIR
offers the user a tradeoff between download rate and
waiting time. The user can pick the number of servers
to wait for and achieve asymptotic PIR capacity cor-
responding to this choice. We illustrate the idea in
Example 1.
Example 1 (Universally robust Staircase-PIR). Let
n = 3 servers and we want to tolerate up to 1
straggler, i.e., k = 2. Assume the servers do not
collude, i.e., t = 1. We describe the Staircase-PIR that
simultaneously achieves C(1, 2) = 1/2 in the case of
1 straggler, µ = 2, and C(1, 3) = 2/3 in the case of
no stragglers, µ = 3.
Let f1, . . . , fm be the files stored on the servers.
We divide each file fi into 2 parts and denote the
ith file as fi = [xi, xm+i]. We represent the data by
the vector1 x = [x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , x2m]
T . Let
ei denote the all zero vector of length 2m with a
‘1’ in the ith entry. The ith file can be expressed as
1All vectors are column vectors and the superscript T denotes
the transpose operator.
Server1 Server 2 Server 3
Storage x x x
Queries
r1 ei + r1 2ei + em+i + r1
r2 em+i + r2 2em+i + r2
Responses
r
T
1 x (ei + r1)
T
x (2ei + em+i + r1)
T
x
r
T
2 x (em+i + r2)
T
x (2em+i + r2)
T
x
x =
[
x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , x2m
]T
fi = [xi, xm+i] = [e
T
i x, e
T
m+ix]
ei = [0, . . . , 0, 1︸︷︷︸
ith
, 0, . . . , 0]T
entry
r1 and r2: random vectors
Notation
TABLE I: An example of Staircase-PIR code for n = 3, k = 2 and t = 1. The user sends 2 sub-queries to
each server. Each server projects the data on the sub-query vectors and sends the result to the user. If all 3
servers are not stragglers, the user only downloads the first response (in blue) from each server to retrieve the
required file as follows xi = (ei + r1)
Tx − rT1 x and xm+i = (2ei + em+i + r1)
Tx − rT1 x − 2xi. The rate
of this scheme is equal to C(1, 3) = 2/3, because the user downloads 3 responses to retrieve the 2 parts of
the file fi = [xi, xm+i]. If 1 server is a straggler, the user downloads 2 responses from each of the remaining
servers to retrieve the file. The user can retrieve the file irrespective of which server is a straggler. The rate of
this scheme is C(1, 2) = 1/2, because the user downloads 4 responses to retrieve the file.
fi = [e
T
i x, e
T
m+ix] which is the projection of x on ei
and em+i. To construct the Staircase-PIR scheme, we
use two independent random vectors r1 and r2 each
of length 2m with entries drawn uniformly at random
from GF (2). We encode the queries using Staircase
codes as shown in Table I.
The user sends 2 sub-queries to each server which
projects the data on the queries and sends the result to
the user. If one server is straggler, the user downloads
all the sub-queries from the other 2 servers to retrieve
the file. For instance, if server 3 is the straggler, the
user downloads all the responses from servers 1 and 2,
i.e., 4 responses in total, and retrieves fi = [xi, xm+i]
as xi = (ei + r1)
Tx − rT1 x and xm+i = (em+i +
r2)
Tx− rT2 x. The rate in this case is equal to 2/4 =
1/2 = C(1, 2). However, if no server is straggler, the
user only downloads the first response (in blue) of all
3 servers to retrieve the file. The rate in this case is
equal to 2/3 = C(1, 3). Privacy is achieved because
ei and em+i are padded with random vectors.
Related work: Private information retrieval was intro-
duced by Chor et al. [1], [2] and was followed up by
a large body of work, e.g., [15]–[26]. The literature
mainly focused on reducing the communication cost
of privately retrieving the file. The early body of
work measured the communication cost by the amount
of information uploaded (queries) and downloaded
(responses) by the user [16]–[19]. Given the increasing
size of stored files, the recent body of work measures
the communication cost by the amount of information
downloaded by the user, assuming the queries are too
small compared to the downloaded files [15], [20]–
[26] which is the assumption we adopt in this paper.
Robust PIR was studied in the literature, e.g., [15],
[25]–[31] and the capacity of robust PIR schemes
under download cost was characterized in [15], [25],
[26] for replicated data. The common focus of the
literature has been on designing robust PIR that are not
necessarily universal, which are tailored to a specific
number of stragglers. In [29] the authors present a
universally robust PIR scheme for the no collusion
case and when the data is stored on the servers using
a maximum distance separable (MDS) code.
Contributions: We introduce Staircase-PIR, a univer-
sally robust PIR scheme achieving asymptotic capacity
for any number of stragglers up to a given threshold.
Compared to the previous work on universal PIR [29],
this work allows servers’ collusion but is restricted to
the case of replicated data. The main ingredient of
the proposed scheme is Staircase secret sharing codes
introduced by the authors in [32], [33]. Moreover, we
establish an equivalence between robust PIR schemes
achieving asymptotic capacity and communication ef-
ficient secret sharing schemes.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
We consider robust private information retrieval.
The data x is formed of m files f1, . . . , fm and is
replicated on n servers. A user wants to retrieve a file
fi from the data without revealing the identity i of
the file to the servers. A robust PIR scheme encodes a
set of queries q1, . . . ,qn to be sent by the user to the
servers. Let I denote the random variable representing
the identity of the file that the user wants and let F
be the random variable representing the file fi. Let Qi
denote the random variable representing query qi and
let [n] , {1, . . . , n}. For any subset B ⊆ [n] denote
by QB the set of random variables representing the
queries indexed by B, i.e., QB = {Qi : i ∈ B}. Let
H(.) denote the entropy function. Then, a universally
robust PIR scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Universally robust PIR). A universally
robust PIR (UR-PIR) scheme is a scheme that satisfies
the following properties:
1) Privacy: Any subset of t or less queries do not reveal
any information about the identity of the file, i.e.,
H(I | QT ) = H(I), ∀ T ⊂ [n] s.t. |T | = t. (3)
2) Robustness: When receiving the responses of any µ
servers, k ≤ µ ≤ n, the user obtains the file,
H(F | QA) = 0, ∀A ⊆ [n] s.t. k ≤ |A| ≤ n. (4)
3) Optimality: The capacity of robust PIR is [15]
C(t, k) = 1−
t
k
. (5)
We say that the scheme is optimal if the rate of the
scheme achieves C(t, k) given in (5), i.e.,
H(F)
H(QA)
= 1−
t
µ
, ∀A ⊂ [n] s.t. |A| = µ, (6)
for all µ, k ≤ µ ≤ n.
In addition, we refer to a robust PIR achieving
capacity C(t, k) as an (n, k, t) robust PIR and we
refer to a universally robust PIR achieving capacity
C(t, µ) for all k ≤ µ ≤ n as an (n, k, t) UR-PIR. We
introduce Staircase-PIR, a deterministic construction
for all (n, k, t) UR-PIR schemes.
Theorem 1. The (n, k, t) Staircase-PIR scheme de-
scribed in Section III-A is a universally robust PIR,
i.e., satisfies the required privacy and robustness con-
straints given in (3) and (4) for any given t < k ≤ n,
and achieves the asymptotic capacity of robust PIR
C(t, µ) = 1−
t
µ
,
simultaneously for all µ such that k ≤ µ ≤ n.
III. STAIRCASE-PIR SCHEME
A. Staircase-PIR construction
We describe the (n, k, t) Staircase-PIR scheme.
The scheme consists of three steps: 1) the user
encodes the queries q1, . . . ,qn and sends them to
the servers; 2) each server i, i = 1, . . . , n, projects
the data on the received query, i.e., computes qTi x
and sends the result to the user; and 3) the user
decodes the requested file. We start by explaining
the encoding of the queries. Let µj = n − j + 1,
and αj = µj − t, j = 1, . . . , n − k + 1. Staircase-
PIR divides each query into α sub-queries, where
α = LCM(α1, . . . , αn−k) is the least common
multiple of all the αj’s except the last αn−k+1 = k−t.
Consequently, the construction assumes that each
file fi of the data is divided into α
′ = (k − t)α
parts, i.e., fi = [xi, xm+i, . . . , x(α′−1)m+i] =
[eTi x, . . . , e
T
(α′−1)m+ix] for i = 1, . . . ,m,
and x = [x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , xα′m]. Let
e′j,i , e(j−1)m+i, we drop the index of the
requested file i when it is clear from the context.
To retrieve file i, the user encodes e′1, . . . , e
′
α′ together
with tα iid random vectors r1, . . . , rα′ into n queries.
The random vectors are drawn uniformly at random
from GF (2) and independently of the e′j’s. To encode
the queries, we arrange the e′j’s in an α1 × α
′/α1
matrix E and the random vectors in n−k+1 matrices
Rj , j = 1, . . . , n − k + 1, of respective dimensions
t×α′/αjαj−1 (take α0 = 1). Note that each entry of
the matrices E and the Rj’s is a vector of length αm.
We arrange E and the Rj ’s in n − k + 1 matrices
Mj, j = 1, . . . , n− k + 1, as follows,
M1 =

 E
R1

 and Mj =

Dj−1Rj
0

 j 6= 1,
where, Dl is a matrix of dimensions αl+1×α
′/αlαl+1,
l = 1, . . . , n− k, formed of the (n− l + 1)
th
row of[
M1 M2 · · · Ml
]
wrapped around to fit the above
mentioned dimensions. Each matrix Mj is completed
to n rows with the all zero matrix 0. We obtain the
encoding matrixM defined in Table II by concatenat-
ing the n− k+1 matrices Mj , j = 1, . . . , n− k+1.
Note that the positions of Rj and Dj−1 (similarly R1
and E) in M can be switched without affecting the
construction.
M =


D2
. . . Dh−1
D1 Rh
E R3
. . .
R2
0
R1 0
. . .
0


.
TABLE II: The structure of the matrix M used to
encode the queries of Staircase-PIR.
Encoding of the queries: Let V be an n× n Vander-
monde2 matrix over GF (q), q > n. The matrix M is
multiplied by V to obtain the query matrix Q = VM.
The queries sent to the servers are the n rows of Q.
Note that each row of Q consists of α entries, hence
each query is divided in α sub-queries.
Retrieving the file: To retrieve the wanted file by
waiting for any µj servers indexed by L ⊆ [n],
the user only downloads the projection of x on the
first α′/αj sub-queries from each contacted servers
corresponding to (vl
[
M1 · · · Mj
]
)Tx, for all l ∈ L,
where vl denote the l
th row of V . Decoding all
2We require all square sub-matrices formed by consecutive
columns of V to be invertible. Two family of matrices satisfying
this property are Vandermonde and Cauchy matrices.
the e′’s from the received parts of the responses is
guaranteed by [32, Theorem 2], therefore retrieving
the file [e′1, . . . , e
′
α′ ]
Tx follows from the linearity of
the scheme.
Optimality: When waiting for µj servers, the user
downloads µjα
′/αj responses to retrieve the α
′ parts
of the file. Therefore, the rate of the scheme is equal
to α′/(µjα
′/αj) = αj/µj = (µj − t)/µj = C(t, µj)
given in (2).
Privacy: Each subset of at most t servers obtain no
information about the identity of the wanted file. Each
server i, i = 1, . . . , n, observes only the query qi. Pri-
vacy follows from [32, Theorem 2] which guarantees
that any collection of t queries leak no information
about the e′j’s.
B. Examples of Staircase-PIR
First we show how the scheme in Example 1 was
obtained using the general construction.
Example 1 (Continued). Recall that we want to con-
struct an (n, k, t) = (3, 2, 1) Staircase-PIR scheme.
Each file is divided into two parts fi = [e
T
i x, e
T
m+ix]
and the construction uses two random vectors r1 and
r2. The matrix M is created by arranging the vectors
ei and em+i in E = [ei, em+i] and by having
R1 = [r1], R2 = [r2] and D1 = [em+i]. The matrix
M in this example is given by
M =

R1 R2
E
D1
0

 =

 r1 r2ei em+i
em+i 0

 .
The user constructs the query matrix Q = VM as
given in (7), where each row qi of Q is the query sent
to server i. The queries are given in Table I.
Q = VM =

1 0 01 1 0
1 2 1



 r1 r2ei em+i
em+i 0

 . (7)
Next we give a second example that illustrates in
more details the general construction of Staircase-PIR.
Example 2. We construct an (n, k, t) = (4, 2, 1)
Staircase-PIR. Let µ1 = 4, µ2 = 3, µ3 = 2,
α1 = 3, α2 = 2, α3 = 1 and α = LCM(α1, α2) =
LCM(3, 2) = 6. We divide the files into α′ =
6 parts each, i.e., fi = [e
T
i x, . . . , e
T
5m+ix] ,
[e′1
T
x, . . . , e′6
T
x]. The construction uses tα = 6 iid
random vectors r1, . . . , r6 drawn uniformly at random
from GF (2). The e′j’s and the random vectors are
arranged in the following matrices,
E =

e
′
1 e
′
4
e′2 e
′
5
e′3 e
′
6

 , R1 = [r1 r2] ,
R2 =
[
r3
]
, and R3 =
[
r4 r5 r6
]
.
Server 1 Server 2
(e′1 + e
′
2 + e
′
3 + r1)
T
x (e′1 + 2e
′
2 + 4e
′
3 + 3r1)
T
x
(e′4 + e
′
5 + e
′
6 + r2)
T
x (e′4 + 2e
′
5 + 4e
′
6 + 3r2)
T
x
(r1 + r2 + r3)Tx (r1 + 2r2 + 4r3)Tx
(e′3 + r4)
T
x (e′3 + 2r4)
T
x
(e′6 + r5)
T
x (e′6 + 2r5)
T
x
(r3 + r6)Tx (r3 + 2r6)Tx
Server 3 Server 4
(e′1 + 3e
′
2 + 4e
′
3 + 2r1)
T
x (e′1 + 4e
′
2 + e
′
3 + 4r1)
T
x
(e′4 + 3e
′
5 + 4e
′
6 + 2r2)
T
x (e′4 + 4e
′
5 + e
′
6 + 4r2)
T
x
(r1 + 3r2 + 4r3)Tx (r1 + 4r2 + r3)Tx
(e′3 + 3r4)
T
x (e′3 + 4r4)
T
x
(e′6 + 3r5)
T
x (e′6 + 4r5)
T
x
(r3 + 3r6)Tx (r3 + 4r6)Tx
TABLE III: The responses sent by the servers when
using an (n, k, t) = (4, 2, 1) Staircase-PIR scheme.
To build the matrixM which will be used for encoding
the queries, we start with
M1 =
[
e′1 e
′
2 e
′
3 r1
e′4 e
′
5 e
′
6 r2
]T
.
Then, D1 is the α2 × α
′/α1α2 = 2 × 1 ma-
trix containing the entries of the nth row of
M1, i.e., D1 =
[
r1 r2
]T
. Therefore, M2 =[
D1 R2 0
]T
=
[
r1 r2 r3 0
]T
. Similarly, we
have D2 =
[
e′3 e
′
6 r3
]
and
M3 =


e′3 e
′
6 r3
r4 r5 r6
0 0 0
0 0 0

 .
We obtain M by concatenating M1, M2 and M3,
M =


e′1 e
′
4 r1 e
′
3 e
′
6 r3
e′2 e
′
5 r2 r4 r5 r6
e′3 e
′
6 r3 0 0 0
r1 r2 0 0 0 0

 .
The matrix V is the n×n = 4×4 Vandermonde matrix
over GF (5) given in (8). The query qj sent to server
j is the j th row of the matrix Q = VM. The responses
to the queries, i.e., QTx are given in Table III.
V =


1 1 1 1
1 2 4 3
1 3 4 2
1 4 1 4

 . (8)
After receiving qj , each server j projects the data
x on qj and sends the result back to the user. We
illustrate how the user can retrieve the wanted file
by achieving the PIR capacity C(t, µ) given in (2)
simultaneously for µ1 = 4, µ2 = 3 and µ2 = 2.
Suppose the user waits for µ1 = 4 servers. The
user downloads the first α′/α1 = 2 responses of each
server corresponding to (VM1)
Tx (first two rows in
black in Table III). Recall that V is a Vandermonde
matrix, hence is invertible. The user multiplies the
received responses by the inverse of V to decode
MT1 x which contains e
′
j
T
x for j = 1, . . . , 6, therefore
retrieving the desired file. The rate of this PIR scheme
is equal to 6/8 = 3/4 = C(1, 4), because the user
decodes the 6 parts of the file by downloading 8
responses.
If the user waits for µ2 = 3 servers indexed by
L ⊂ [n], the user downloads the first α′/α2 = 3
responses of each contacted server corresponding to(
VL
[
M1 M2
])T
x (in black and red), where VL is
the matrix formed by the rows of V indexed by L ⊂ [n].
Recall that VL here is a 3×4 Vandermonde matrix. The
user can retrieve the file as follows. SinceM2 has a 0
as its last entry, (VLM2)
T
x reduces to (V ′LM2)
T
x,
where V ′L is the 3× 3 invertible Vandermonde matrix
formed of the first three columns of VL. The user can
then decode MT2 x which consists of r
T
1 x, r
T
2 x and
rT3 x. By subtracting r
T
i x from (VLM1)
T
x, the user
obtains (V ′LM
′
1)
T
x where M′L is the matrix formed
by the the first three columns of M1. By inverting
V ′L the user can decode M
′
1
T
x which contains the
required file. The rate of this PIR scheme is equal to
6/9 = 2/3 = C(1, 3), because the user decodes the 6
parts of file by downloading 9 responses.
Following a similar procedure, the user can retrieve
the file by downloading all the responses from any 2
servers. The rate here is C(1, 2) = 1/2 because the
user downloads 12 responses to decode the requested
file.
On a high level, privacy is guaranteed because each
sub-query is padded with a different random vector.
IV. FROM SECRET SHARING TO PIR
The connection between secret sharing and PIR has
been studied in the literature, e.g., [16], [27], [34]. Our
Staircase-PIR construction was obtained using Stair-
case codes for communication efficient secret sharing
[32]. In this section, we explore more this connection
between communication efficient secret sharing [33],
[35]–[38] and capacity achieving robust PIR schemes.
Definition 2 (Secret sharing scheme). A secret sharing
scheme is an encoding of a secret s into n shares
w1, . . . ,wn stored on n servers, such that a user
accessing any subset of t or less shares obtains
no information about s, however by accessing any
collection of k or more shares the user can reconstruct
the whole secret. Let S denote the random variable
representing the secret s and Wi denote the random
variable representing the share wi. A secret sharing
scheme satisfies the following properties:
1) Perfect secrecy: expressed as
H(S | WT ) = H(S), ∀T ⊂ [n] s.t. |T | = t. (9)
2) MDS: or reconstruction of the secret,
H(S | WA) = 0, ∀A ⊆ [n] s.t. |A| = k, (10)
and the secret is of size (k− t) units as implied by (9)
and (10) (see [36, Proposition 1]).
We refer to a secret sharing scheme as defined above
as an (n, k, t) secret sharing.
Definition 3 (Communication efficient secret sharing).
A communication efficient secret sharing is a secret
sharing scheme that allows the user to reconstruct the
secret by downloading a part of any d shares, k ≤
d ≤ n. When accessing d servers, the user needs only
to download the optimal rate d(k− t)/(d− t) units of
information given in [35], [36].
Now we are ready to describe how to obtain a robust
PIR scheme from a secret sharing (SS) scheme. We
call this construction SS-PIR construction.
SS-PIR construction: An (n, k, t) robust PIR can
be constructed using linear secret sharing as follows.
Let fi, the i
th entry of the data x, be the file of
interest expressed as fi = xi = e
T
i x. To construct
an (n, k, t) robust PIR scheme, the user encodes the
queries q1, . . . ,qn using an (n, k, t) linear secret
sharing scheme with s = ei and sends those queries
to the n servers. After receiving the query, each server
j projects the data x on qj and sends q
T
j x to the user.
Proposition 1. An information retrieval scheme ob-
tained from the SS-PIR construction is a robust PIR
scheme, i.e., guarantees privacy and robustness and
achieves asymptotic capacity equal to
C(t, k) = 1−
t
k
.
We give the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
We generalize Proposition 1 to show that a PIR scheme
constructed using a communication efficient secret
sharing is universally robust.
Proposition 2. An information retrieval scheme con-
structed using an (n, k, t) linear communication effi-
cient secret sharing scheme is a universally robust PIR
that achieves PIR capacity
C(t, µ) = 1−
t
µ
,
simultaneously for all k ≤ µ ≤ n.
The proof of Proposition 2 can also be found in the
Appendix. The implication of this Proposition is that
any communication efficient secret sharing including
Staircase codes can be used to obtain universally
robust PIR through SS-PIR construction.
V. CONCLUSION
We study robust private information retrieval (PIR).
A user wants retrieve a file by querying n servers
without revealing the identity of the required file to
the servers. We assume the servers can collude and
consider the setting in which the servers might be
stragglers, i.e., slow or unresponsive. We introduce
Staircase-PIR, a universally robust PIR scheme that
allows the user to successfully retrieve the file by
waiting only for the non straggler servers. This scheme
achieves the PIR capacity simultaneously for any num-
ber of stragglers up to a given threshold. Moreover, we
give a general construction to obtain universally robust
PIR from communication efficient secret sharing.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We show that an information retrieval scheme con-
structed using linear secret sharing scheme is a robust
PIR scheme, i.e., guarantees privacy and robustness,
and achieves asymptotic PIR capacity.
Privacy: Any subset of t or less servers obtain no in-
formation about the identity of the file of interest. Each
server observes a query encoded using an (n, k, t)
secret sharing. From the secrecy constraint of secret
sharing (9), any t or less servers obtain no information
about ei, which represents the identity of the file.
Robustness: After receiving the responses qTj x from
any k servers, j ∈ [n], the user can retrieve fi. From
the MDS property of the secret sharing (10), the user
can decode ei from any k queries qj , j ∈ [n]. By
linearity of the secret sharing scheme, after receiving
k responses qTj x from the servers, the user is able to
decode fi = e
T
i x. In other words, since all the queries
are multiplied by the same vector x, being able to
decode the secret s = ei from the queries implies the
ability of decoding the file eTi x from the responses,
c.f. Section III-B.
Optimality: We show that this PIR scheme is optimal,
i.e., achieves C(t, k) given in (2). To retrieve the file,
the user has to download k responses, i.e., k units of
information. Secret sharing assumes that the size of the
retrieved file is k− t units of information3. Therefore,
the rate of this PIR scheme is (k − t)/k achieving
C(t, k).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We show that an information retrieval scheme en-
coding the queries using a linear communication ef-
ficient secret sharing scheme is an (n, k, t) UR-PIR.
Note that privacy and robustness to any number of
unresponsive servers are guaranteed by the properties
of secret sharing and by the ability of decoding the
secret by accessing any d shares. The additional prop-
erty that we comment on is the optimality of retrieving
the file when any number of servers µ, k ≤ µ ≤ n,
are stragglers. When a user receives responses from
µ servers it only needs to download µ(k − t)/(µ− t)
units of information to retrieve the file of size k − t.
Therefore, the rate of this scheme is equal to (µ−t)/µ
achieving (2) with equality.
3The scheme can be scaled so that the file is of size 1 unit of
information, each query becomes of size 1/(k − t).
